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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. Case No. 870236 
JUANITA IRENE BURGE, ROBERT 
D- BARROWS, JR; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; et al. 
Defendants/Appellants 
BRIEF OF APPELLANTS 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This court has jurisdiction to hear this matter pursuant 
to the provisions of § 3 and 5, Article VIII of the Utah 
Constitution; § 78-2-2 Utah Code Ann,, 1953 (1987 Supp.), and 
Rule 3 of the Rules of the Utah Supreme Court. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Whether paragraph 1(d) of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy requires that possession of the subject property 
must be transferred to the plaintiff as a condition of 
plaintiff's duty to pay interest required by paragraph 1(a), 
or whether 1(d) simply establishes the conditions which must 
be met before possession shall be transferred as provided in 
paragraph 1(e). 
2. If the court finds that paragraph 1(d) establishes a 
condition to the payment of interest, does it constitute a 
condition to the whole agreement being in full force and 
effect or simply a condition precedent to the payment of 
interest. 
3. If the court finds that paragraph 1(d) is a condition 
precedent to the payment of interest, has such condition 
occurred and/or was such condition not material, such that 
the plaintiff still has a duty to pay interest. 
4. If the plaintiff still has a duty to pay interest, 
for what period has such interest accrued and what amount 
should be set off for the non-occurrence of a condition, if 
any. 
5. Does the trial court have discretion to reimburse a 
successful litigant for expert witness fees and other trial 
preparation expenses under a statute which authorizes an 
award to an owner whose property is acquired in condemnation, 
for "costs, including a reasonable attorney's fee...". 
6. Whether such statute authorizes an award of costs and 
attorney's fees incurred for this appeal. 
TEXT OF AUTHORITIES 
See reprint of § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953, 
attached to the Appendix hereof as Exhibit "C". 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Subsequent to the filing of this condemnation action the 
plaintiff filed a Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy, 
which was Motion opposed by the property owners on the 
grounds that the plaintiff did not need immediate possession, 
and in any event lacked the power of eminent domain in this 
instance. Prior to a ruling by the trial court on 
plaintiff's Motion the defendant landowners and other 
neighboring owners not parties to this lawsuit entered into a 
contract and agreement setting forth promises between the 
parties for the sale of the property and/or plaintiff's 
occupancy thereof prior to a change of ownership. Such 
agreement was approved by the court and entered as a pleading 
herein entitled "Order of Immediate Occupancy". That 
agreement provided for plaintiff's deposit of funds with the 
clerk of the court and for interest on the amounts on deposit 
to be paid to the owners. The trial court denied the owners' 
motion for an award of such interest as well as for an award 
of expert witness fees and other trial preparation costs 
necessarily incurred, from which denial this appeal is taken. 
3 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The defendants, Juanita Irene Burge, Robert D. Barrows, 
Jr., and Beatrice Irene Barrows (hereinafter the "owners"), 
were the owners of real property located at 62, 64, and 66 
East 200 South (hereinafter the "property") in Salt Lake 
City, Utah. The other defendants (hereinafter "tenants") in 
this action were joined because they were tenants occupying 
the property at the time of commencement of this action. The 
property is located on block 57 and the plaintiff, 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, brought this action 
on June 24, 1985, to condemn the total tract as part of its 
redevelopment plans for the block.1 Plaintiff then filed its 
Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy on or about August 1, 
1985.2 The tenants stipulated that plaintiff could have 
immediate possession,3 but the Motion was opposed by the 
owners cis set forth in their Answer to Motion for Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, Motion and Notice filed on or about 
August 6, 1985.4 The matter was set for hearing on August 
13, 1985, at which time the plaintiff, owners, and neighbors 
who also owned land on block 57 (hereinafter "neighbors") and 
their attorneys met prior to argument and entered into an 
agreement which was stipulated to in open court and entered 
1
 Complaint (R. 2-7). 
2
 R. 38-40. 
3
 R. 71-75. 
4
 R. 218-225. 
4 
into the record entitled Order of Immediate Occupancy^ 
(hereinafter the "Order" or "contract", a copy of which is 
included in the addendum as Exhibit "A" and made a part 
hereof) . It is the interpretation of the meaning of that 
contract that gives rise to Point I of this appeal. 
The factual background explaining plaintiff's need for 
immediate occupancy was presented to the court upon proffer 
at the hearing on March 25, 1987,6 and is not in dispute 
except for the interpretation of the meaning of the terms of 
the Contract.7 Prior to filing this action the plaintiff had 
entered into an agreement with Lincoln Property Company 
(hereinafter "Lincoln") to be the developer of block 57, but 
Lincoln was becoming less interested in proceeding with 
development because of mounting obstacles. Owners of 
property located within the South two-thirds of the block had 
filed suit contesting the right and power of the plaintiff to 
condemn, which action was pending before Judge Raymond Uno. 
An interlocutory appeal to the Utah Supreme Court had upheld 
Judge Uno's denial of plaintiff's Motion for Summary 
Judgment, so there was still a question at the time of the 
hearing on plaintiff's Motion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy as to whether or not the plaintiff even had the 
5
 R. 230-239. 
6
 Transcript (R. 769-782). 
7
 Id. at 782-783. 36 line 16 and page 37 line 7. 
5 
power of condemnation of block 578. 
Lincoln still showed some interest in developing the 
north one-third of the block but was not willing to proceed 
with development plans until the plaintiff obtained 
possession of the subject property and established that it 
had the power of condemnation. If these issues were not 
immediately resolved Lincoln was ready to walk away from its 
participation leaving the plaintiff without a developer. 
This would delay plaintiff's buy-out of the neighbors, 
(represented by B. Ray Zoll) who were anxious to sell their 
rapidly deteriorating parcels.9 
In order to induce Lincoln to sign an Agreement for 
Distribution of Land for Private Development (hereinafter 
"ADL"), which would commit Lincoln to proceed with 
development of the north one-third of the block, the 
plaintiff sought an agreement from the owners to give 
plaintiff an option to remain open as long as 60 days to buy 
the property free of any claims or defenses that could be 
raised by the owners. The owners agreed as set forth in the 
contract. Before the contract was entered with the court in 
its final form a written proposal thereof (hereinafter the 
"draft,"' a copy of which is attached to the Addendum herein 
as Exhibit "B") was prepared by plaintiff's attorney, Harold 
A. Hintze, and submitted to the owners' attorney, John T. 
8
 R. 25. 
9
 R. 25-28, 36-37. 
6 
Evans, who made modifications thereof that were incorporated 
into the final written contract.10 That contract was then 
signed on behalf of the parties thereto by their attorneys or 
legal representatives, and entered by the court on August 
16, 1985, entitled "Order of Immediate Occupancy"11. 
At the time of entry of the Order of Immediate Occupancy 
funds in the amount of $275,220.00 were deposited by 
plaintiff with the clerk as agreed, which were invested by 
the clerk earning interest at the highest rate available for 
federally insured accounts.12 
On August 22, 1985, the defendant tenants filed their 
Objection to the Order of Immediate Occupancy asserting a 
right to such funds on deposit and objecting to paragraph 
three of the Order excluding the tenants from sharing in the 
funds.13 That objection was heard by the court on November 
1, 1985, at which time the court ordered that such funds be 
frozen and not be distributed to any of the defendants until 
further order of the court, thereby denying the owners the 
right to withdraw such funds or any portion thereof contrary 
to the provisions of the contract.14 
The issue as to the tenants7 right to share in the just 
1 0
 R. 613-624. 
1 1
 R. 231-239. Attached hereto as Exhibit "A". 
1 2
 Order an Post Trial Motions f 5 and 6 (R. 550-552) 
1 3
 R. 234-245. 
1 4
 Order on Post-Trial Motions f 5 and 6 (R. 550-552) 
7 
compensation proceeds came on for trial on February 10, 1987, 
at which the court denied the tenants' claim to the proceeds 
on file with the clerk or any other amount constituting just 
compensation for the taking of the property.15 The amount of 
just compensation was then determined by jury trial on the 
23, 24, and 25 of February, 1987,16 and on March 15, 1987, 
the owners moved the court to lift the stay that was freezing 
the funds and to enter its order that such sums on deposit 
with the clerk including accrued interest be paid to the 
owners,17 This motion was denied and the court ordered the 
whole thereof to be returned to the plaintiff.18 Inasmuch as 
the owners did not withdraw any funds on deposit and Lincoln 
did not enter into its ADL agreement with the plaintiff as 
provided in the contract,19 the plaintiff did not obtain 
possession of the property until June 7, 1987, when it paid 
the owners the amount of $305,800.00 awarded by the jury as 
just compensation, plus attorney's fees of $10,933.00 and 
court costs amounting to the sum of $332.70 plus interest on 
the amount of Judgement from date of entry in the sum of 
$833.05.20 The highest amount which had been offered by the 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
R. 546. 
R. 324-325. 
R. 478. 
Order on Post-Trial Motion f 6. (R. 552). 
Id. at f 5 (R. 551). 
R. 558-562. 
plaintiff prior to filing this action was in the sum of 
$273,000.00,21 hence the amount of the award exceeded the 
amount offered. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Interest accruing from the date of deposit of funds held 
by the clerk is due and owing from the plaintiff to the 
owners because paragraph 1(a) of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy so provides. Paragraph 1(d) did not cause the 
whole Order to become void and fail because it did not 
constitute a condition for the whole Order to take effect. 
It merely clarified what acts would trigger the transfer of 
occupancy provided for in paragraph 1(e). 
Any ambiguity in the language of the Order is clarified 
by the intention of the parties as shown from the fact that 
the proposed draft of the Order deleted a phrase that 
provided the Order would become "null and void" if possession 
were not transferred. Also it would be difficult to 
harmonize all the provisions of the Order if the contract 
were interpreted as being "void" in that the parties had 
bound themselves by mutual promises, the plaintiff had 
already received full performance from the owners, and the 
owners had already received part performance from the 
plaintiff another evidence that possession was not a 
condition was that there was no correlation in the Order 
Exhibit B attached to Complaint; affidavit of 
Chitwood. (R. 9, 42-43, 51]j. 
Q 
between the time period for the running of interest and the 
plaintiffs time of possession. 
Even if paragraph 1(d) were held to have required the 
transfer of possession as a condition to the owners receiving 
interest the plaintiff still has a duty to make such payment 
because they have in fact obtained possession in a timely 
manner, and in any event any requirement that possession be 
transferred as a condition for payment was not material to 
the plaintiffs duty to pay interest. 
In addition to an award of interest owners are also 
seeking reimbursement for their expert witness fees and other 
trial preparation costs, and for attorney's fees incurred in 
connection with this appeal pursuant to § 11-19-23.9 Utah 
Code Ann., 1953. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN DENYING THE OWNERS7 
MOTION FOR AN AWARD OF INTEREST ACCRUING ON 
THE AMOUNT ON DEPOSIT WITH THE COURT AS 
PROVIDED IN THE ORDER OF IMMEDIATE OCCUPANCY 
STIPULATED TO BY THE PARTIES 
The Order of Immediate Occupancy is a contract,22 It was 
reduced to writing, signed by the parties thereto or their 
legal representatives, approved by the court, and is binding 
upon the participants, who were parties to this law-suit and 
2 2
 "A contract is a promise or set of promises for the 
breach of which the law gives a remedy, or the 
performances of which the law in some way recognizes 
as a duty." Restatement (Second) of Contracts f 1 
(1981). 
10 
non-parties alike. The title "Order of Immediate Occupancy" 
is really a misnomer. The document is actually a contract for 
sale and conditional occupancy, not immediate occupancy. 
B. Ray Zoll, attorney at law, represented the neighbors 
who were not parties to this law-suit but were bound by the 
contract. The defendant tenants, although parties to this 
action, were not parties to the contract. They had 
previously entered into their own Stipulation with the 
plaintiff for an Order of Immediate Occupancy and were not in 
attendance at the hearing on August 13, 1985 when the 
agreement was entered into by the parties and approved by the 
court.23 The terms of the contract do not resemble 
plaintiff's Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy24 and the 
contract provisions are not consistent with those of § 78-34-
9 Utah Code Ann. 1953. 
The contract is in the nature of an option25 for the 
purchase of real property in that it gives the plaintiff the 
right to purchase the property within 60 days free and clear 
of any defenses that could be raised by the owners denying 
plaintiff's power of eminent domain or its need for 
possession. But it was not a unilateral contract. In 
consideration for the owners' promise to sell the plaintiff 
also promised to do the following: 
2 3
 R. 232. 
2 4
 R. 38-40. 
2 5
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 87 (1981). 
n 
I- Fair market value. Plaintiff promised to purchase 
the subject property in the amount of such sum as a jury 
verdict would determine to be the fair market value thereof. 
II- Additional compensation. In addition to the jury 
verdict plaintiff promised to pay for the property the 
additional sum of $76,450.00, the payment of which was 
conditional upon the ADL being signed within thirty days. The 
neighbors agreed to reimburse the plaintiff the full amount 
of $76,450.00 by it authorizing the plaintiff to withhold 
that amount from plaintiff's purchase of the neighbor's 
parcels.26 The ADL was never executed hence the $76,450.00 
was nev€*r paid to the owners so neither the purchase of the 
property nor the transfer of its possession were ever 
triggered by this event.27 
III- Deposit with court. Plaintiff promised to deposit 
with the clerk of the court upon entry of the Order of 
Immediate Occupancy, 100% of its approved appraisal being the 
sum of $275,220.00, which amount or any part thereof could be 
withdrawn by the owners at any time upon demand.28 Such sum 
was deposited on or about August 16, 1985, and remained on 
deposit until after the trail court ordered such sums 
including interest earned thereon returned to the 
2 6
 Order of Immediate Occupancy % 1(b) (R. 234-235). 
2 7
 R. 551. 
2 8
 Order of Immediate Occupancy % 1(a). (R. 233-234). 
12 
plaintiff.29 
IV- Interest on the amount on deposit. The plaintiff 
promised to pay interest to begin accruing from the date of 
deposit of the $275,220.00 for a period not to exceed three 
years at a rate of 11 1/2% per annum on such sums remaining 
on deposit during that period.30 It is the trial court's 
refusal to award this interest to the owners that gives cause 
for Point I of this appeal. 
The owners filed their Motion to Amend Judgment on March 
15, 1987, seeking an order lifting the stay against the 
owners from withdrawing the funds on deposit with the clerk, 
and for an award of interest as provided in paragraph 1(a) of 
the Contract.31 The court denied the Motion as set forth in 
its Order on Post-Trial Motions dated May 28, 1987, ordering 
instead that the deposited funds plus accrued interest 
thereon be returned to plaintiff. The court stated it was 
denying the owners' Motion "because the awarding of such 
interest was to be conditional upon plaintiff obtaining 
possession of defendants7 property". But then citing 
paragraph 1(d) of the Order the court went even further by 
stating that not just the payment of interest was 
conditional, but that the whole contract taking effect was 
conditional on plaintiff receiving possession, and since the 
2 9
 R. 551-552. 
3 0
 R. 233-234. 
3 1
 R. 476-479. 
1 "* 
plaintiff did not obtain possession, the whole "Order of 
Immediate Occupancy fails"32. It is this ruling by the trial 
court that the owners contend to be in error. 
With this appeal the owners seek to have the Supreme 
Court interpret the provisions of the contract pertaining to 
the award of interest due and owing to the owners. Since the 
"(i)nterpretation of a written contract is ordinarily a 
question of law, ...this Court need not defer to the trial 
court's construction (citation omitted), but (may)... make 
its own independent interpretation of the contract terms."33 
And where questions arise in the interpretation of an 
agreement, the first source of inquiry is within the document 
itself. It should be looked at in its entirety and in 
accordance with its purpose, and all of its parts should be 
given effect insofar as that is possible.34 
A. Period interest accrues. The interest to be paid is 
that interest on deposited funds accruing at the rate of 11 
1/2% per annum beginning from the date of deposit with the 
court without regard to when possession is transferred, and 
continuing for up to three years as provided in paragraph 
1(a) of the Contract as follows: 
3 2
 R. 551. 
33
 Jones v. Hinkle, 611 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1980). See 
also Bradshaw v. Burningham, 671 P.2d 196, 198 
(Utah 1983). 
34
 Larrabee v. Royal Dairy Products Co., 614, P.2d 
160, 163 (Utah 1980); Restatement (Second) of 
Contracts § 203(a) (1981). 
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(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of the 
Court upon the signing of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon 
a written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While 
retained by the Clerk of the Court, said funds 
shall be invested by the Clerk at the highest 
interest rate available for federally insured 
accounts. The plaintiff, however, agrees and 
warrants that said funds will earn interest at an 
effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from 
the date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and 
that any shortfall or difference between the actual 
interest earned by virtue of the Clerks investment 
and the 11.5 annual percentage rate shall be paid 
by the plaintiff to the defendants Burge, Barrows 
and Barrows upon demand as herein provided. While 
said funds are on deposit with the Clerk of the 
Court, all or any part of said funds may be 
withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a 
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or 
their counsel of record. The withdrawal of all or 
any part of said deposited funds by defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a 
waiver of any and all defenses to the taking by 
condemnation of the subject property as provided in 
Section 78-34-9, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as 
amended, except the issue of just compensation 
which shall then be the sole issue reserved for 
trial, (emphasis added) 
The paragraph discusses the effect of withdrawing 
deposited funds. Withdrawal "constitute(s) a waiver of any 
and all defenses to the taking," but it does not say that 
possession is a condition for interest to begin accruing. 
Interest begins accruing from the date of deposit,35 and it 
was never contemplated that possession would be transferred 
on that date or the owners would have simply agreed to 
"Said funds will earn interest... for the term of 
which they are held by the clerk of the court." 
i R 
immediate possession effective upon entry of the Order as 
sought by plaintiff in its Motion for Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. Funds were deposited with the clerk to be left 
until the owners decided to withdraw the deposited amount, 
and the owners earned interest thereon from date of deposit 
even though the owners retained possession and continued to 
collect rent during the same period. 
For example, had there been no freeze of funds and the 
owners had presented a written request to the clerk 3 0 days 
after deposit for withdrawal of all the funds being held by 
the clerk including interest earned from investment, the 
clerk would have paid such under the contract, even though 
the interest had accruing during the period before the 
plaintiff had possession. Nowhere is the clerk told he 
should first try to determine whether possession had changed 
and whether any interest should be prorated. 
There is simply no connection between the transfer of 
possession and the date interest begins accruing, so whenever 
this court determines that payment of that interest was due 
it would be payable in an amount that had accrued during the 
period the owners still held possession of the premises. If 
interest were not intended to begin running until the date of 
withdrawal of the funds or the date the plaintiff otherwise 
receives possession the contract would not provide for the 
earning of interest from date of deposit. The funds in fact 
were earning interest from the clerk's investment thereof and 
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the plaintiff was required to make up the "difference between 
the actual interest earned by virtue of the clerks investment 
and the 11.5 annual percentage rate "for the same period. 
The main issue before this court then goes to the question 
discussed hereafter as to what event is required to trigger 
the payment of this accrued interest. 
B. Payment of accrued interest is due and payable upon 
demand. This Court is being asked to harmonize the 
provisions of the contract so as to determine what event is 
required to trigger the payment of the interest that has been 
accruing from deposit. It is plaintiff's position that 
paragraph 1(d) prevents the owners from receiving interest 
until they withdrew all or part of the funds on deposit, 
since the act of withdrawal would cause possession to 
immediately vest in plaintiff and possession is a condition 
to the owners receiving interest. It is the owners position 
that interest was due and payable anytime upon demand 
irregardless of whether the plaintiff took possession 
because, (1) the transfer of possession was not a condition 
to the right to receive interest as provided in paragraph 
1(a); but that, (2) if this Court determines that possession 
was a condition of receiving interest plaintiff still has a 
duty to pay because (a) any requirement of possession was met 
when plaintiff received possession in a timely manner, and 
(b) when the plaintiff's right to take possession expired 
after 60 days, possession ceased to become a material 
17 
condition to the contract. 
(1) Paragraph 1(a) shows there is no relationship 
between the payment of interest and the taking of possession 
because interest can be withdrawn without requiring giving up 
possession. It states that possession will be transferred 
when the owners withdraw the deposited sum of $275,220.00, 
not when they withdraw the interest earned thereon.36 Had 
possession been a condition for interest payments the 
contract would have provided for the transfer of possession 
upon the withdrawal of interest. The intent to pay interest 
without transferring possession is also indicated by the fact 
that the period interest accrues bears no relation when 
possession would transfer37. Interest begins running from 
the date of deposit for as long as three years, whereas no 
time was established for the withdrawal of either principal 
or interest. In view of the foregoing if plaintiff had 
intended that interest were not to have been paid until 
possession was transferred it should have been clearly so 
stated, and as the drafter of the Order its provisions should 
Referring to the deposited amount of $275,220.00 
paragraph 1(a) states, "the withdrawal of all or any 
part of said deposited funds by... (owners) shall 
constitute a waiver of any and all defenses to the 
taking...." Paragraph 1(e) likewise states that the 
plaintiff may not begin "collecting rent... until 
the owners "have... withdrawn part or all of the 
$275,220.00 deposited with the clerk...." 
See topic (A) above for discussion. 
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be construed against the plaintiff.-38 
But the trial court held that interest was not payable 
on demand because paragraph 1(a) "fails" along with the rest 
of the contract, for the reason that paragraph 1(d) sets up a 
condition for the whole contract taking effect. This would 
have to mean that the right to take possession, and not the 
right to exercise the owners 60 day option, was the 
consideration for the whole contract, and that plaintiff's 
promise to pay interest was simply an offer that the owners 
could only accept upon relinquishing possession as a 
condition of acceptance, without which there is no agreement 
and the whole Order is void and of no effect. 
The owners' position is that paragraph 1(d) sets forth 
the conditions of plaintiff taking possession, and not 
conditions for the whole contract to be in force and effect, 
for the following reasons: 
(a) Modifies grant of occupancy. Paragraph 1(e) of the 
contract authorizes the plaintiff "to take immediate 
possession of said property...subject to the terms and 
provisions herein." Such terms and provisions are set forth 
in paragraph 1(d) to clarify for the protection of the owners 
that before the plaintiff can take possession the owners must 
first have received either the $76,450.00 or have withdrawn 
all or part of the $275,220.00, as follows: 
Bryant v. Desert News Publishing Co., 120 Utah 241, 
233 P.2d 355 (1951). 
19 
(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be effective 
unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by Lincoln 
Property and the Redevelopment Agency within thirty 
(30) days from date hereof, and the sum of 
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to 
the terms and provisions herein, or (2) the 
defendant land owners have withdrawn all or part of 
the $275,220.00 deposited with the Clerk of the 
Court as herein provided. 
The first two lines of paragraph 1(d) can be restated as 
follows: 
"The Order in paragraph 1(e) granting the plaintiff 
possession and occupancy will not take effect until 
the following conditions are met, (1) the ADL is 
signed by Lincoln...." 
In otherwords paragraph 1(d) did not refer to the 
payment of interest as provided in paragraph 1(a) because 
paragraph 1(a) had already been in effect beginning with its 
entry on August 16, 1985. Paragraph 1(d) set forth a 
condition of possession, not a condition that would void the 
whole contract. 
(b)- Proposed "draft" revisions. Where a contract is 
clear the court should "determine the intention of the 
parties from the four corners of the instrument."39 But if a 
contract is not clear the courts may look not only to the 
language* but to the intention of the parties ascertained from 
the purpose the parties had in making the agreement,40 the 
course of performance and dealing between the parties,41 and 
Oregon Railroad Company v.Idaho Stock Yards Company, 
12 Utah 2d 205, 364 P.2d 826, 827 (1961). 
Anderson v. Great Eastern Casualty Company 168 Pac. 
966, 968 (Utah 1917). 
Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 202 (1981). 
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the surrounding circumstances.42 One of the best evidences 
that the parties intended the contract would not become 
"void" is the elimination by the parties of just such a 
provision at the time the initial proposed draft of the 
contract was revised. 
Plaintiff prepared a proposed "draft" of the contract 
which set forth exactly the terms and conditions it now 
contends the final executed contract stands for, ie, that if 
possession were not given to the plaintiff the whole contract 
became "null and void" and declared "vacated" so the 
plaintiff could have its deposit returned. Paragraph 1(d) of 
that proposed draft43 (which was not executed) stated as 
follows: 
(d) If the ADL is not signed by Lincoln Property and/or 
the Redevelopment Agency within thirty (30) days from 
date hereof, or the defendant land owners have not 
withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 deposited with 
the Clerk of the Court as herein provided, or if the sum 
of $76,450.00 above provided has not been paid pursuant 
to the terms and provisions herein, then this Order of 
Immediate Occupancy is null and void and upon Motion of 
4 2
 "It is a fundamental rule that in the construction 
of Contracts the courts may look not only to the 
language employed, but to the subject-matter and 
the surrounding circumstances.... (Citation 
omitted) To ascertain the intention, regard must be 
had to the nature of the instrument itself, the 
condition of the parties executing it, and the 
objects they had in view. The words employed, if 
capable of more than one meaning, are to be given 
that meaning which it is apparent the parties 
intended them to have." Kintner v. Harr, 146 Mont. 
461, 408 P.2d 487, 494 (1965). (Cited with 
approval in Big Cottonwood Tanner Ditch Co. v. Salt 
Lake City, 63 Utah Adv. Rep. 42, 44-45 (1987)). 
4 3
 See Appendix Exhibit "B"; R. 613-624. 
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either of the parties, said Order of Immediate Occupancy 
may be vacated upon a showing that the terms and 
provisions herein have not been complied with. 
The function of paragraph 1(d) is to explain the 
consequence if neither the ADL is signed nor the owners 
withdraw any of the deposited funds. The proposed draft 
stated that if neither of these events occur "this Order of 
Immediate Occupancy is null and void." The final executed 
contract stated that if neither of these events occurred 
"this Order of Occupancy shall not be effective," meaning the 
granting of occupancy set forth in paragraph 1(e) shall not 
take effect. 
if is significant that in the final contract document 
reference to the contract being "null and void" are stricken, 
and that instead of referring to the whole document by name 
("Order of Immediate Occupancy") as no longer being 
"effective", that was changed to read that the "Order of 
Occupancy shall not be effective", meaning that the portion 
of the contract ordering possession and occupancy (paragraph 
1(e) shall not take effect. 
It is also significant that the proposed draft provided 
that the "Order of Immediate Occupancy may be vacated," 
implying the funds could be returned to the plaintiff. This 
provision was stricken from the final contract and the 
deposited funds remained on deposit with the clerk almost two 
years with the plaintiff making no effort to obtain the 
return of either principal or accrued interest. Even after 
22 
expiration of the initial sixty day option period when 
plaintiff no longer needed immediate possession plaintiff 
understood it was still bound by contract to leave those 
funds earning interest on deposit. 
It is also significant that the revision of the proposed 
draft eliminated any possible time limit by which the owners 
were required to withdraw the funds. The proposed draft 
could have possibly been construed as requiring the owners to 
withdraw the money before the expiration of sixty days in 
order to avoid having the Order declared "void" or "vacated". 
But with the removal of those references there remained no 
indication of any intention to limit the time within which 
the owners could withdraw the funds, and that is why the 
plaintiff did not ask for the return of the funds. It was 
committed to leaving them earning interest for up to three 
years and could not unilaterally decide to terminate the 
accrual of that interest. 
(c) Incongruous results. Inconsistent results would 
follow plaintiffs interpretation that the agreement is void, 
in that, (i) the parties were already bound by the provisions 
of the contract, (ii) part performance of the agreement had 
already occurred, (iii) the plaintiff had already received 
the consideration from the owners for the payment of the 
interest, (iv) any time requirement for withdrawal was 
omitted, and because of, (v) conduct of plaintiff. 
(i) Parties were already bound by the contract. The 
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owners were committed to sell during the 60 day option 
period, and had the plaintiff exercised its option to 
purchase the property and paid the $76,450.00 payment as 
required the owners would have to convey. It is not a matter 
of there being no contract in effect unless possession is 
given. The owners gave their promise and the contract was 
binding upon them. 
(ii) Part performance had already occurred. The Order 
was obviously not void because from date of entry it required 
the owner to give a 60 day option,44 the plaintiff to deposit 
with the clerk 100 percent of the approved appraisal45 and to 
submit the ADL to Lincoln within ten days to be signed46, and 
clerk to invest the money on deposit,47 all of which were 
performed. These were requirements of a valid contract, 
without which the plaintiff would not have left the funds on 
deposit discussed above. 
(iii) Consideration already received: Although the 
plaintiff did not exercise its right to purchase it received 
what it bargained for, i.e., an option to remain open up to 
60 days to purchase free and clear of any claims or defenses 
the owner could assert. After approximately October 16, 
4 4
 1(b) of Order. 
4 5
 Id. 1 1(a). 
4 6
 Id. K 1(b). 
4 7
 Id. 1 1(a). 
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1985,48 the plaintiff had received the benefit of the owners' 
promise to sell, which is one reason paragraph 1(a) allows 
the owners to withdraw interest at any time without 
possession being transferred. The option was the 
consideration for the payment of interest, not possession. 
But plaintiff argues that since it did not exercise its 
option the whole agreement is void and the parties go back to 
their original position as though there had been no contract 
obligating plaintiff to fulfill its promises to pay interest. 
It is analogous to paying cash for a sixty day option to buy 
Blackacre, and after failing to exercise the option asking 
for the cash back. 
The payment of interest was the only significant 
consideration the plaintiff was to pay for the owners' 
promise to sell. The additional $76,450.00 to be paid was a 
contribution by the neighbors and did not come out of the 
plaintiff's pocket.49 Depositing 100% of the approved 
appraisal was of no particular value to the owners if no 
interest was running on it, and deposits in such amounts are 
routinely made by condemning agencies because that much is 
almost always recovered at trial. And even most of the 
interest due was earned from the clerk's investments, and the 
plaintiff now wants that interest earned on the money the 
owners were to receive as payment for their property being 
4 8
 Sixty days after entry of the Order. 
4 9
 U 1(c) of Order. 
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taken. The contract makes it clear that payment of the 
$76,450.00 is conditioned upon possession being given.50 
Nowhere does it state such a condition for interest payment 
however. 
(iv) Correlation between possession and interest is 
lacking. Were it intended that possession was a 
consideration for the payment of interest there would be some 
relationship between the time of possession held by plaintiff 
and the amount of interest to be paid. Had plaintiff 
intended that interest payment be an incentive for the owners 
to give up possession the amount of interest would decrease 
the longer it took before possession was given. This is the 
reason why in a normal condemnation case where possession is 
awarded pursuant to § 78-34-9 Utah Code Ann., 1953, interest 
begins accruing only from the time plaintiff takes possession 
and only on so much of the just compensation not already 
deposited with the clerk and only for the period ending upon 
entry of the Final Order of Condemnation. 
But the instant contract is not simply an Order of 
Immediate Occupancy pursuant to § 78-34-9. It is also an 
option contract and that is why it does not provide for 
interest to begin running from date of possession as it 
normally would. This contract also provides for 
consideration to be given for the option promised by the 
owners, and that consideration is interest running on the 
5 0
 Id. t 1(b). 
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amount on deposit from date of deposit. The contract is 
silent as to any time requirement for the transfer of 
possession as a condition for interest to run. The payment 
of interest may run as long as three years. It offers no 
incentive for the owners to transfer possession. To the 
contrary the incentive is to leave the funds on deposit which 
acted as a savings account earning a higher rate of interest 
than normal. 
Imposing any type of time deadline for the withdrawal of 
those funds where none exists in the contract would lead to 
an unconscionable forfeiture not intended by any of the 
parties. For this reason any doubt as to whether the 
withdrawal of funds from the clerk is a condition to the 
payment of interest should be resolved in favor of the 
owners.51 Justice would not be furthered by the harsh 
forfeiture of interest that had accrued for a considerable 
time if some vague withdrawal deadline passed without notice 
being first given to the owners. Obviously, had the contract 
clearly provided for any such deadline for the withdrawal of 
funds before forfeiture the owners would have done everything 
possible to protect the recovery of that interest. And the 
5 1
 In resolving doubts as to whether an event 
(withdrawal of funds) is made a condition of an 
obligor's duty (to pay interest), and as to the 
nature of such an event, an interpretation is 
preferred that will reduce the obligee's (owners') 
risk of forfeiture unless the event is within the 
obligee's control or the circumstances indicate 
that he has assumed the risk. Restatement (Second) 
of Contracts § 227(1) (1981). 
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reverse of that situation makes it obvious that interest was 
not a quid pro quo of possession in that had the owners 
withdrawn the interest one week prior to the deadline for the 
conveying of possession, receipt of a large sum would not 
represent the value of one weeks occupancy of the property. 
It becomes obvious that the interest running from the date of 
deposit was consideration for the option and not for 
plaintiffs use of the property. 
(v) Conduct of Plaintiff. Plaintiff understood that 
the owners7 failure to withdraw any funds on deposit did not 
void the contract or it would not have left the funds with 
the clerk for almost two years without seeking there return. 
Not until the owners asked permission of the court to 
withdraw the funds52 did the plaintiff deny the owners' right 
thereto. Had plaintiff obtained possession by exercising its 
option within 60 days there is little doubt that the interest 
earning during that period would have been paid to the owners 
"upon demand" even though earned prior to the transfer of 
possession. Plaintiff cannot now deny its duty to pay just 
because the plaintiff chose not to exercise its option. The 
neighbors would have still contributed $76,450.00 to be 
bought out immediately by the plaintiff. Just because the 
plaintiff chose not to exercise its option and obtain the 
possession as contemplated does not mean it can deny its duty 
to pay interest almost two years later. If plaintiff had 
5 2
 R. 478. 
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honestly intended that interest would not be payable unless 
possession had been transferred, plaintiff's draft of 
paragraph 1(d) should have specifically so stated. Such 
omission is a glaring defect in the drafting of the 
agreement, and certainly enough so to have mislead the 
parties. No where does paragraph 1(d) state that the 
contract would be "void", "vacated", or that interest shall 
be "in lieu of possession", or "in lieu of rent". Paragraph 
1(a), however, is clear that interest begins running from 
deposit and is payable upon demand. A clear paragraph should 
prevail over a vague one. 
(2) If possession is a condition. Even if the transfer 
of possession to the plaintiff were a condition which must 
occur before the plaintiff has a duty to pay interest the 
plaintiff's duty is not discharged and interest is now due 
and owing because (a) the transfer of possession has in fact 
occurred in a timely manner, and (b) even if the transfer of 
possession to the plaintiff was not timely such transfer of 
possession was not a material condition to the payment of 
interest, hence plaintiff's obligation to pay interest should 
be enforced. 
(a) Condition occurred. Even if the transfer of 
possession to the plaintiff was a condition of the 
plaintiff's duty to pay interest, that condition was fully 
satisfied in that, (i) actual possession of the subject 
property has been received by the plaintiff, and (ii) the 
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possession was received in a timely manner. 
(i)- Actual possession received by plaintiff. After 
the expiration of the sixty day option for plaintiff to 
acquire the property it could still obtain possession. It 
was not helpless to sit around forever to obtain occupancy. 
It could file another Motion for Order of Immediate Occupancy 
if it were then able to satisfy the requirements of § 78-34-9 
Utah Code Ann., 1953. It could wait for the owners to 
withdraw of any portion of the sums deposited with the clerk. 
The owners formally elected to do this by filing their Motion 
to Amend Judgement on March 15, 1987 seeking to have the 
freeze on the funds lifted and an order that such sums on 
deposit be paid to the owners, but such tender of possession 
was opposed by the plaintiff and the court denied the owners 
the right to withdraw any such funds or the interest accrued 
thereon. It could seek an expedited trial setting to obtain 
a Final Order of Condemnation conveying title and possession, 
or it could wait for the regular trial setting which in fact 
is what occurred on February 23, 1987, at which time the 
jury determined the amount of just compensation which was 
paid by the plaintiff on June 7, 1987, at which time a Final 
Order of Condemnation was entered, thereby transferring 
possession. 
(ii)- Timeliness of possession. The tender of 
possession and its transfer occurred in a timely manner. In 
fact the* best evidence that possession was not a condition is 
30 
the fact there simply was no time limit in the Order by which 
possession must be transferred before interest is payable. 
It certainly was not contemplated that the owners would give 
possession by withdrawing funds during the first sixty days 
or the plaintiff would have no incentive to expedite the 
signing of the ADL and the payment to the owners of 
$76,450.00. They would have no reason to pay that money if 
they already had possession. As far as how long the owners 
had to leave the funds on deposit it would seem that up to 
three years was contemplated, because that's how long the 
plaintiff agreed to pay interest on the funds remaining on 
deposit.53 
Even if one adopts the plaintiff's position that the 
whole contract was void without the transfer of possession 
(the withdrawal of funds being a condition of acceptance of 
plaintiff's offer to pay interest) plaintiff's offer was 
never revoked and in fact leaving the funds on deposit 
without requesting their return, manifested plaintiff's 
intention that its offer remain open. Not until the owners 
requested court permission to withdraw the funds did the 
plaintiff seek their return. The owners relied on the fact 
that those funds remained on deposit earning interest during 
that period and by allowing that to happen plaintiff should 
be estopped from now asserting that its offer to pay interest 
had been withdrawn. 
53
 f 1(a) of the Order. 
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(b) Possession not a material condition. As noted 
above at paragraph B(l) if possession is a condition of the 
payment of interest it is not a condition to the whole 
contract taking effect. There was already an agreement 
binding upon the parties to do certain things which already 
had been performed pursuant to mutual promises. Any 
requirement to transfer possession would simply constitute a 
condition precedent to the payment of interest becoming due 
as a requirement of a valid contract. However, the 
non-occurrence of such a condition does not relieve the 
plaintiff of its obligation to pay interest where the 
condition is only incidental to the agreement,54 and this is 
especially true where the non-occurrence of a condition is 
due to impossibility.55 In this case the impossibility was 
due to the court's freezing of the funds on deposit over 
which the owners had no control, in which case any doubt as 
to whether the withdrawal of funds was a material condition 
should be construed in favor of the owners.56 
Since the plaintiff would be obligated to pay interest 
if the condition were not material the question becomes 
whether the plaintiff's failure to have possession (from 
whatever time the court determines possession was to have 
5 4
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts 
§ 237. 
5 5
 Restatement (Second) of Contracts § 230(2)(b); 
6 Corbin on Contracts § 13 62 (1962). 
5 6
 Restatement (Second) of Contract § 227. 
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been given to the time plaintiff took possession on June 7, 
1987,) was a material breach of the contract such that 
plaintiff's promise to pay interest should not be enforced. 
As discussed hereafter it is the owners7 position that 
failure to withdraw the funds on deposit is not material the 
non-occurrence does not put the plaintiff "to a disadvantage 
or adversely effects his rights,"57 that the plaintiff can 
be compensated for being deprived of possession by giving 
credit for rents it would have received, the harm suffered by 
the owners would be great if a forfeiture of all the interest 
was allowed to take place, the plaintiff has now obtained 
possession of the property and therefore any such non-
performance has been cured, the fact that the owners have 
acted in good faith,58 and the fact that the withdrawing of 
funds beyond their control.59 
The bargained for consideration required by the 
plaintiff was the owners' promise to convey the property 
within sixty days at a time when the whole redevelopment 
future of block 57 seemed to be hanging in the balance. 
After that, possession was incidental. Plaintiff had lost 
its developer and all it was going to do was evict the 
tenants and tear down the building, so it would not have even 
5 7
 Utah State Building Board v. Walsh Plumbing Co., 399 
P.2d 141, 144, 16 Utah 2d 249 (1965). 
5 8
 Restatement (Second) Contract § 241. 
59
 Restatement (Second) Contracts § 230(2) (b). 
3 3 
had the benefit of rents that the owners received. Plaintiff 
did not ask the owners for possession even though the 
neighbors remained anxious to be bought out and would no 
doubt have still contributed funds to bring expedite purchase 
of their land. Plaintiff did not seek an early trial date. 
Even after just compensation was determined at trial 
plaintiff waited over three months to file it's Final Order 
of Condemnation and obtain possession. It asked for at least 
six months after the Final Order was entered in which to raze 
the buildings on the property60 even though it already had 
the tenants stipulation for immediate occupancy,61 and when 
the defendant filed it's motion to withdraw funds thereby 
automatically transferring possession, such motion was 
opposed by plaintiff.62 
Not having possession did not prejudice the plaintiff 
because the funds on deposit with the clerk continued to earn 
interest from investment that would reduce the total interest 
owing by the plaintiff, and the total payment owing from the 
plaintiff is still less than the additional $76,450.00 it 
would have been had the ADL been signed. The plaintiff 
received the benefit of the owners' option which was the 
primary consideration it needed, it had no developer that had 
any interest in the property. 
6 0
 R. 553. 
6 1
 R. 71-75. 
62
 R. 787-788. 
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Whatever prejudice has been caused plaintiff is it's own 
fault. It allowed the funds to remain with the clerk for 
almost two years without seeking their return. Plaintiff 
could have asked the court to allow a bond to be placed in 
lieu of funds on deposit pursuant to § 78-34-16, Utah Code 
Ann., 1953. It created a distressed situation with block 57 
making it impossible to sell, improve, or keep suitable 
tenants on the premises. For two years the plaintiff watched 
the owners collect rents in an amount much less than the 
owners could have received in interest, all the time allowing 
the funds on deposit to remain invested by the clerk and 
thereby misleading the owners into thinking that the owners 
were entitled to the interest being earned. Plaintiff had a 
duty to come forward and ask for it's money back if it did 
not think the money belonged to anyone else, and by failing 
to do so waves it right to later asserting a claim thereto.63 
The plaintiff could have obtained possession any time it 
wanted by buying the neighbor's land and giving the 
defendants $76,450.00 even though no ADL was signed. The 
neighbors had no reason to care whether the ADL was signed or 
a developer was going ahead. They simply wanted to be bought 
out immediately from property that was rapidly deteriorating. 
As it turned out plaintiff did in fact purchase properties 
from the neighbors before obtaining possession from the 
63
 See 17 Am Jur 2d Contracts § 9 nt 6, stating a 
plaintiff can be estopped by conduct from denying a 
provision in a contract. 
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owners of the subject property or otherwise notifying them of 
that purchase. 
The owners have acted in good faith at all times. After 
it became clear that plaintiff had no developers for the 
property in the immediate future, the owners were anxious to 
transfer possession. Following the ruling from Judge Raymond 
Uno to the effect that the plaintiff lacked the powers of 
eminent domain in acquiring block 57, the plaintiff's 
attorney, William Oswald, advised the owners' attorney, John 
T. Evans, that the plaintiff was willing to walk away from 
the condemnation if the owners so desired. At that time Mr. 
Evans indicated that the owners wished to be bought out and 
would be proceeding toward trial on the issue of just 
compensation, but obviously would not be raising a defense 
against the plaintiff's right to condemn under such 
circumstances, nor did the owners so contest such right at 
trial. The owners were in an untenable position of being 
surrounded by blighted neighborhood, unable to improve their 
property or attract good tenants, tenants have no incentive 
to continue to be current on their rent, yet the owners' 
hands were tied due to the freezing of the money on deposit. 
And when they did ask the trial court to allow their 
withdrawal of the funds, their motion was opposed by the 
plaintiff and they were refused by the trial court. Prior to 
that time the owners were willing to allow matters to take 
their natural course in reliance upon the Order of Immediate 
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Occupancy, assured that their money on deposit was earning 
interest for them. 
The remedy in the event of the non-occurrence of a 
condition not material to the plaintiff is for the plaintiff 
to be required to fulfill its duty by paying interest in full 
as required under the terms of the contract less the cost of 
what was not performed, which in this case would be an offset 
for the benefit to the plaintiff of the net rent it would 
have received had possession been given.64 It should be 
emphasized however, that the remedy of allowing a deduction 
from interest in the amount of net rents is only appropriate 
in the event this court finds that possession was a condition 
to the payment of interest and that such possession was not 
material to the plaintiff. The matter should be remanded to 
the district court to determine what interest the owners 
would be entitled to receive under the Order and what rents 
should be deducted therefrom if any by way of set-off. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT IS AUTHORIZED TO MAKE AN 
AWARD FOR EXPERT WITNESS FEES OR OTHER 
TRIAL PREPARATION EXPENSES PURSUANT TO 
§ 11-19-23.9, UTAH CODE ANN., 1953 
In preparation for the jury trial held on February 23, 
24, and 25, 1987, on the issue of just compensation, 
reasonable and necessary expenses were incurred by the owners 
(in addition to attorney's fees and court costs) as fees for 
6 Corbin on Contracts § 1370 (1962). 
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expert consultants as follows: 
a. Ralph Fo Evans, Architect $500.00 
b. Dean Webb, Structural Engineer $4,390.67 
c. John K. Bushnell, M.A.I. Appraiser $9,000.00 
d. Robert J. Holmes, M.A.I. Appraiser $3,912.00 
e. John C. Brown, A.S.A. Appraiser $600.00 
Of the foregoing Dean Webb, John K. Bushnell, and Robert J. 
Holmes were called to testify at trial as expert witnesses.65 
The owners made a motion66 for the court make an award 
of the aforementioned sums pursuant to § 11-19-23.9 Utah Code 
Ann., 1953.67 This motion was denied by the court which 
found that the statute "as a matter of law does not authorize 
it to make an award for other expenses incurred such as 
expert witness fees, notwithstanding that expert witness fees 
and expenses were necessarily incurred in this matter...".68 
The statute authorizes an award for "costs, including a 
reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court." 
Plaintiff argued that "costs" as used in the statute referred 
to "court costs" provided for in Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure69 and the trial court interpreted its authority as 
though the statute only allowed an award of "court costs and 
6 5
 R. 511-512. 
6 6
 R. 477-478. 
6 7
 See full text of Statute in Appendix Exhibit C. 
6 8
 Order On Post Trial Motions f 7 (R. 552). 
6 9
 R. 795. 
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attorney's fees". The owners assert that the statute 
authorizes an award of expert witness fees and other trial 
preparation expenses reasonably and necessarily incurred 
because this was the intention of legislature70 as determined 
by, (A) the natural, commonly accepted meaning of the words 
of the statute, (B) the identical expression is repeated in 
the same statute, and (C) and because of the reason and 
purpose for the statute. 
A. Commonly accepted meaning. There is a presumption 
that the meaning of terms in a statute should be given there 
ordinary, commonly accepted meaning.71 There is nothing in 
the statute that would indicate a legislative intent to limit 
the meaning of "costs" to the narrow definition of "court 
costs" that are taxable under the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. The ordinary meaning of costs has a much broader 
interpretation that includes "(1) the amount...paid...for 
anything.. ., (2) loss of any kind;... (3) the outlay of 
money...."72 "Costs" can also mean "attorneys' fees" under a 
70 "The primary rule of construction of statutes is to 
ascertain and declare the intention of the 
legislature and to carry such intention into 
effect." 73 Am Jur 2d, Statutes, § 145. 
7 1
 Parkinson v. State Bank, 84 Utah 278, 35 P.2d 814, 
94 ALR 1112. 
7 2
 Webster's New Collegiate Dictionary 188 (2d ed. 
1954) , defining cost pertaining to law as, "in a 
general sense, expenses incurred in litigation; as; 
(a) Those payable to the attorney or counsel by his 
client, esp. when fixed by law; — commonly called 
fees. (b) Those given by the law or the court to 
the prevailing party against the loosing party. — 
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statute authorizing an award for "costs as may seem equitable 
and just."73 
The broad definition of "costs" is especially applicable 
when followed by "including", which ordinarily is a word of 
enlargement and not of limitation. It "expands" the word 
"costs" to include expenses outside the narrow definition of 
"court costs".74 Using other synonyms for "including" 
clarifies "attorney's fees" comprise part of and are included 
within the meaning of "costs". "Costs" as used in the 
statute does not mean "court costs". 
B. Identical expressions. Words used in one place in a 
statute are presumed to have the same meaning in every other 
place in the statute, especially when it is used in the same 
section, in the same subject matter, looking to the same 
general purpose.75 In addition to providing for "costs, 
including a reasonable attorney's fee", the same statute goes 
on to authorize an award "for the costs and expenses, if any, 
of relocating the owner...." It is obvious that relocating 
the owner does not involve incurring "court costs", hence the 
intention of the legislature was for "costs" to indicate its 
Syn. price expense, charge. 
7 3
 The Western Casualty and Surety Company v. Marchant, 
615 P.2d 423, 427 (Utah, 1980). 
7 4
 Pacific Automobile Insurance Company v. Commercial 
Casualty Insurance Company, 161 P.2d 423, 424 (Utah 
1945). 
7 5
 Spring Canyon Coal Company v. Industrial Commission, 
74 Utah 103, 277 Pac. 206. 
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broader meaning in the nature of reimbursement of expenses 
incurred caused by the condemnation. 
C. Purpose of statute. Determining the purpose of a 
statute is important in ascertaining legislative intent.76 
The legislative concern for making sure that owners deprived 
of their property are made whole without having to take a 
loss is evident from the broad scope of compensation covered 
by the statute: 
"...(TJhe court may,...award in addition to his 
just compensation, costs, including a reasonable 
attorney's fee as determined by the court. The 
court...may also award a reasonable sum as 
compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of 
relocating the owner.... An award may also be made 
for damages to any fixtures or personal property 
owned by the owner of such acquired property. .. if 
such fixtures or personal property are damaged as a 
result of such acquisition or relocation." § 11-19-
23.9. 
The same legislative concern to compensate condemnees 
beyond the fair market value they are entitled to receive is 
evident in court rulings that have interpreted similar 
statutes as authorizing an award for expert witness fees.77 
Since the legislature intended that the owners should not 
have to incur expenses for costs, moving, damage to fixtures 
or attorney's fees in defending an action there is every 
7 6
 Norville v. State Tax Commission, 98 Utah 170, 97 P.Zd 
973, 126 ALR 1318. 
7 7
 Union Exploration Company v. Moffat Tunnel 
Improvement District. 104 Colo. 109, 89 P.2d 257 
(1939); Dade County v. Brigham, 47 So. 2d 602 (Fla. 
1950), a copy of which is attached to the Appendix 
hereto as Exhibit "D". 
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reason to believe they did not intend that an owner should 
have to incur the expense of expert witnesses, which can 
often amount to a greater expense than the attorney fees. It 
does not make sense to authorize an award for attorney's fees 
so the owners can defend themselves knowing that the attorney 
cannot effectively defend his client without retaining expert 
witnesses. In that sense expert witness fees are really a 
part of attorney's fees in that they are part of the costs 
incurred by the attorney in preparing for the trial just as 
are his other out of pocket costs. 
This case should be remanded to the trial court with 
instruction that § 11-19-23.9 authorizes an award for expert 
witness fees and other trial preparation expenses reasonably 
and necessarily incurred and that the trial court may so 
award at its discretion. 
POINT III 
THE OWNERS SHOULD BE TO AN AWARDED FOR COSTS 
AND ATTORNEY'S FEES NECESSARILY INCURRED FOR 
THIS APPEAL PURSUANT TO § 11-19-23.9, UTAH 
CODE ANN., 1953 
An award of attorney's fees to a condemnee is permitted 
by § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 1953.78 The owners seek to 
have this Court in its discretion grant attorney's fees 
necessarily incurred for this appeal and to remand this case 
to the District Court for its determination of such 
Reproduced in the Appendix as Exhibit "C". 
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reasonable attorney's fees and costs./y 
CONCLUSION 
The owner seeks to have this court reverse the trial 
court's Order denying the owners Motion for an award of 
interest pursuant to the provisions of the Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and denying the owners' motion for an award for 
expert witness fees, and that this matter be remanded to the 
trial court with instructions to enter a judgement in favor 
of the owners in the amount of 11 1/2% interest per annum on 
the sum of $276,220.00 from August 16, 1985 to June 7, 1987, 
plus interest from June 7, 1987 to August 16, 1988, on the 
principal sum of $276,220.00 at the rate of 11 1/2% per annum 
less the rate at which said principal would have earned funds 
if fully invested at the highest rate available for federally 
insured accounts. The owners further seek to have this court 
instruct the trial court that § 11-19-23.9, Utah Code Ann., 
1953, authorizes the trial court to make an award to the 
owners for expert witness fees and other litigation expenses 
reasonably and necessarily incurred, and that the District 
Court further make a determination of reasonable attorney's 
fees to be granted to the owners for the appeal of this case. 
Management Services Corp. v. Development Associates, 
617 P.2d 406 (Utah 1980). 
A ^ 
Dated this 7th day of December 1987, 
DART, ADAMSON & KASTING 
John T. Evans Attorney for 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT 
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN 
SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an indi-
vidual, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an indi-
vidual, dba AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND 
SALES, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion; 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Hon. Homer F, 
Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before 
• v/.\ I O 
- 2 -
The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on 
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being 
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D. 
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of 
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the 
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows 
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by 
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James 
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry 
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither 
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney 
of record Jerome Moody, Esq., said defendants having 
been served timely notice of said Motions but having 
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy 
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing 
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the 
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David 
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, 235 South Main Associates, 235 
South Main, Inc., Egan and Associates, and Harold Egan, 
the parties and other land owners having reached an open 
court stipulation which has been recited and agreed to 
orally before the Court on August 13, 1985, said 
Stipulation to be the basis of an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy. pOA^ 
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NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit: 
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the 
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57, Plat 
"A", Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17 
inch party wall and which point is further 
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the 
sidewalk north of said wall by R.W. 
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south 
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south 
55 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north 
165 feet to the point of beginning. 
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms 
and provisions: 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of 
the Court upon signing of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon a 
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While retained 
by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested 
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for 
federally insured accounts. The plaintiff, however, 
agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest 
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any 
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shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5 
annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon demand as 
herein provided. While said funds are on deposit with 
the Clerk of the Court, all or any part of said funds 
may be withdrawn hereafter at the option of defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a 
written demand of Burge, Barrows and Barrows or their 
counsel of record. The withdrawal of all or any part of 
said deposited funds by defendants Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows shall constitute a waiver of any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject 
property as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue of just 
compensation which shall then be the sole issue reserved 
for trial. 
(b) On entry of this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy, the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
shall submit within ten (10) days of the date hereof to 
Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. (Lincoln) for 
signature an Agreement for Distribution of Land for 
Private Development (ADL). Said ADL must be fully 
executed by the Redevelopment Agency and Lincoln within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof. Within thirty (30) 
days from execution of the ADL by Lincoln, the 
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Redevelopment Agency shall pay Burge, Barrows and 
Barrows $76f450.00 as hereinafter described and exercise 
its option to purchase and the owners shall sell the 
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by 
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen 
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5, 
1985 and the Extension Agreement extending said Offer to 
sixty (60) days from date hereof. The Redevelopment 
Agency in disbursement of the purchase price for said 
Mortensen property may withhold, and Mortensen 
authorizes the Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign 
to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said 
funds, and solely from said funds, the sum of $76/450.00 
to be paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows upon 
the closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of 
David Mortensen's interest in the property located at 
235 South Main Street, but not to exceed thirty (30) 
days from the date Lincoln executes the ADL. Said sum 
of $76,450.00 shall be paid as additional compensation 
over and above any just compensation ultimately found by 
the court or jury in this case to be the fair market 
value of the property being condemned herein and the 
receipt of said funds shall not be an offset or 
deduction from said just compensation and the receipt of 
the same shall not be disclosed to the jury. Upon 
payment to defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the 
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sum of $76,450.00, said defendants by receipt thereof, 
waive any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation 
of the subject property in the same manner as would 
occur by withdrawal of funds deposited with the Clerk of 
the Court pursuant to the aforementioned Section 
78-34-9. 
(c) David Mortensen1s obligation in 
regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00 
is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's 
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the 
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235 
South Main Street and if the fund from which this 
partial assignment has been made does not come into 
existence and Mortensen is not paid at least $76,450.00 
or entitled to immediate payment thereof by virtue of 
the fact that the Offer to Purchase is not consummated 
for any reason, said Mortensen shall have absolutely no 
liability to make any payments to the defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows by virtue of this Order. 
(d) This Order of Occupancy shall not be 
effective unless or until, (1) the ADL is signed by 
Lincoln Property and the Redevelopment Agency within 
thirty (30) days from date hereof, and the sum of 
$76,450.00 above provided has been paid pursuant to the 
terms and provisions herein, or (2) the defendant land 
owners have withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 
- 7 -
deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein 
provided. 
(e) Based upon the terms and conditions of 
the oral Stipulation made to the Court, the Court does 
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the 
subject property is sought for uses by the public in 
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project 
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake 
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and 
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession 
of said property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just 
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions 
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this 
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff or its agents may 
do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes 
for which said property is sought to be condemned 
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing 
improvements and construction of new improvements or 
structures, without interference by defendants or any of 
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no 
demolition of the existing building, collecting of rent, 
or eviction of existing tenants pursuant to said Order 
of Immediate Occupancy will occur until the defendants 
have either withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 
- 8 -
deposited with the Clerk of the Court as provided herein 
or have received payment from David Mortensen through 
the Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein 
provided* 
2. The Redevelopment Agency stipulates to 
extend the offers for purchase of the condominium 
properties located at 235 South Main Street, which 
include the owners represented herein by B. Ray Zoll, 
for sixty (60) days from the date hereof. 
3. Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds 
to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came 
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that 
under the terms of occupancy by the tenant-defendants, 
to-wit: Ellen K. Daskalas, an individual, dba The Pawn 
Shop, The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James Anderson, 
an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry Pantelakis, an 
individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, and Loans and 
Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation of the subject premises, 
said tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to 
be awarded in this action as just compensation and that 
all sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and by virtue of the final judgment of just 
compensation shall be the sole property of, and are to 
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be paid directly to the owner-defendants, to-wit: 
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice 
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the 
tenant-defendants. 
Dated this /S day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
APROVED AS TO FROM: 
lomer F. Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
REDEVELOPMENT AGENCY OF 
SALT LAKE CITY, a public 
entity, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNIATA IRENE BURGE; ROBERT 
G. BARROWS; BEATRICE 
IRENE BARROWS; ELLEN K. 
DASKALAS, an individual, 
dba THE PAWN SHOP, THE PAWN 
SHOP, a Utah Corporation; 
JAMES ANDERSON, an indi-
vidual, dba JIM'S RIBS; 
TERRY PANTELAKIS, an indi-
vidual, dba AAA JEWELERS 
AND LOANS; and LOANS AND 
SALES, INC., a Utah Corpora-
tion; 
Defendants. 
ORDER OF IMMEDIATE 
OCCUPANCY 
Civil No. C85-4017 
JUDGE: Hon. Homer F. 
Wilkinson 
Plaintiff's Motion.for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy and Defendant Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion came on for a hearing pursuant to notice before 
r : vanEL, - r - ^ ii fi'iOKtc; 
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The Honorable Homer F. Wilkinson, District Judge on 
August 13, 1985 at 8:30 a.m., the plaintiff being 
represented by Harold A. Hintze, Esq. and William D. 
Oswald, Esq., and Michael Chitwood Executive Director of 
the Salt Lake Redevelopment Agency being present, the 
defendants Juniata Irene Burge, Beatrice Irene Barrows 
and Robert G. Barrows being present and represented by 
John T. Evans, Esq. the defendants Ellen K. Daskalas, an 
individual, dba The Pawn Shop, a Utah corporation, James 
Anderson, an individual, dba Jim's Ribs, Terry 
Pantelakis, an individual, dba AAA Jewelers and Loans, 
and Loans and Sales, Inc., a Utah corporation, neither 
appearing personally nor by and through their attorney 
of record .Jerome Moodyc JEsq. bjjf^said defendants ,having y[0UA/2Mrfo( 
heretofore filed a Stipulation for Immediate Occupancy 
which is on file herein, and Ray Zoll representing 
himself as a property owner and as attorney for the 
following land owners in Block 57, Plat "A", Salt Lake 
City Survey and located at 235 South Main Street, David * J^c Cqju, 
Mortensen, Erv Wilfred, and Harold Egan,.the parties and 
other land owners having reached an open court 
stipulation which has been recited and agreed to orally 
before the Court on August 13, 1985, said Stipulation to 
be the basis of an Order of Immediate Occupancy. 
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND 
ADJUDGED: 
ST 
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1. Plaintiff's Motion for an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy of the following described property, to-wit : -
may be granted subject to and upon the following terms 
/ and provisions: 
\ 
Beginning at a point 166 feet west of the 
northeast Corner of Lot 6, Block 57
 f Plat 
"A" , Salt Lake City Survey, and running 
thence east 69 feet to the center of a 17 
inch party wall and which point is further 
evidenced by a metal plug inserted in the 
sidewalk north of said wall by R.W. 
Sorensen, licensed surveyor; thence south 
110 feet; thence west 68 feet; thence south 
5 5 feet; thence west 1 foot; thence north 
165 feet to the point of beginning, 
(a) Plaintiff shall pay into the Clerk of 
the Court upon signing of .an Order of Immediate 
Occupancy the sum of $275,220.00, being 100% of the 
appraised value of the subject property based upon a 
written appraisal obtained by plaintiff. While retained 
by the Clerk of the Court, said funds shall be invested 
by the Clerk at the highest interest rate available for sJfy?&%~ 
federally insured accounts. The plaintiff, however, 
agrees and warrants that said funds will earn interest 
at an effective rate of 11.5 annual percentage rate.for 
the term of which they are held by the Clerk of the 
Court, not to exceed a period of three years from the 
date of the Order of Immediate Occupancy and that any 
shortfall or difference between the actual interest 
earned by virtue of the Clerk's investment and the 11.5 
/T»/lM*%<f f3 
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annual percentage rate shall be paid by the plaintiff to 
the defendants Burge, Barr/ows and Barrows .as herein 
provided. While said funds are on deposit with the Clerk 
of the Court, Any or\all/part of said funds may be 
withdrawn hereafter at the optjpn of.defendants Burge, 
Barrows and Barrows, or any of them, upon a written 
demand of their counsel of record. The withdrawal of 
all or any part of said deposited funds by defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows shall constitute a waiver of 
any and all defenses to the taking by condemnation of 
the subject property as provided in Section 78-34-9, 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953, as amended, except the issue 
of just compensation which shall be the sole issue 
/ 
reserved for trial. 
(b) On entry of £b€ Order of Immediate 
Occupancy^ the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City 
shall submit.to Lincoln Property Company N.C., Inc. 
(Lincoln) for signature arysrAgreement for Distribution 
of Land for Private Development (ADD • Said ADL must be 
fully executed by (£he Redevelopment Agency and jLincoln 
within thirty (3oTdays from date ^ ereof* Within thirty 
(3JL)—days from execution of theADL/\ the Redevelopment 
Agency shall)exercise its option to purchase* the 
property located at 235 South Main Street, owned by 
Mountain States Creamery Company and David Mortensen, 
pursuant to the written Offer to Purchase dated April 5, 
;
 V / 
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1985 and the Extension Agreemer^ extending said Offer to 
sixty (60) days from date hereof. 4uThe Redevelopment y '^ NSaL 
Agency in disbursement ot^the^purchase price ^ of said 1/'tiiv.t* / ^ ^ 
property may withhold and Mortensen authorizes the 
Redevelopment Agency to pay to and assign to the 
defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows from said funds, 
and solely from said funds, ±he sum of $76,450.00 to be 
paid to defendants Burge, Barrows and Bar BOWS/jipon the 
closing of the Redevelopment Agency's acquisition of 
David Mortensen1Si interest in the property located at 
235 South Main Street- Said sun} ofe $76,450.00 shall be 
paid as additional compensation over and above any just 
compensation ultimately found by the court or jury in 
this case to be the fair market value of the property 
being condemned herein and the receipt of said funds 
shall not be an offset or deduction from said just 
compensation and the receipt of the same shall not be 
disclosed to the jury. Upon payment to defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows of the sura of $76,450.00, 
said defendants by receipt thereof, waive any and all 
defenses to the taking by condemnation of the subject 
property in the same manner as would occur by withdrawal 
of funds deposited with the Clerk of the Court pursuant 
to the aforementioned Section 78-34-9. 
(c) David Mortensen1s obligation in 
regards to the payment of the aforementioned $76,450.00 
',£ / 
« 
TTm 
11 
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17 
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is solely conditioned upon the Redevelopment Agency's 
election to exercise its right of acceptance under the 
aforementioned Offer to Purchase the property at 235 
South Main Street and if the fund from which this 
fsby 
Purchase is not accepted by the Redevelopment Agency, 
said Mortensen shall have no liability to make any 
payments to the defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows by 
virtue of this Ord 
^ « " f « f t * ^ h . AD 
Property 
'^t 
jnj i^signed by Lincoln 
>pmeiTt^ -Ag«ficy. /wi th in th i r t y 
____ 
(30) davs^f rom date^hereof^or^ the defendant land owners 
^-^Tiave jatftT withdrawn all or part of the $275,220.00 
deposited with the Clerk of the Court as herein 
r. 
P|^j^ied^eir=r£--the sum of $76,450.00 above provided has / '^^Jv 
&&€ been (paid pursuant to the terms and provisions / 
herein* 'then this Ore >r of> Immediate Occupancy is null 
and void and upon Motion/of either of the parties, said 
Order of Immediate Occ^p^ncy may be vacated upon a 
showing that the ter^s an\jl provisions herein have not 
been complied witl 
(e) Based/ upon>AH 
the oral Stipulation made to the Qburt,, the Court*'does 
hereby enter an Order of Immediate Occupancy that the 
subject property is sought for uses by the public in 
- 7 -
connection with and as part of a redevelopment project 
authorized and approved by the City Council of Salt Lake 
City and the Redevelopment Agency of Salt Lake City, and 
the plaintiff is authorized to take immediate possession 
of said property and continue in possession of the same 
pending further hearing and trial on the issue of just 
compensation which, subject to the terms and provisions 
herein, is the only issue which may be raised in this 
action as provided in Section 78-34-9, Utah Code 
Annotated 1953, as amended. Plaintiff or its agents may 
do such work thereon as may be required for the purposes 
for which said property is sought to be condemned 
including, but not limited to, demolition of existing 
improvements and construction of new improvements or 
structures, without interference by defendants or any of 
defendants' partners, agents, or employees, however, no 
demolition of the existing building^or^eviction of 
existing tenants pursuant to said Order of Immediate 
Occupancy will occur until the defendants have either 
withdrawn part or all of the $275,220.00 deposited with 
the Clerk of the Court as provided herein or have 
received payment from David Mortensen through the 
Redevelopment Agency of the $76,450.00 as herein 
provided. i 
2^ « Defendants Burge, Barrows and Barrows' 
Motion in regards to the manner of disbursement of funds 
HM(M;?? 
Q 
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to be deposited with the Clerk as above described came 
on for a hearing and no one appearing in opposition 
thereto, the Court being duly advised in the premises 
and good cause appearing therefore, now orders that 
under the terras of occupancy by the tenant-defendants, 
to-witi Juniata ikene Burge, Robert G. Barrows, and uAAiM^/} 
—"Beatrice Irene Barrows)of the subject premises, said 
tenants have no right or claim to the proceeds to be 
awarded in this action as just compensation and that all 
sums paid pursuant to this Order of Immediate Occupancy 
and by virtue of the final iudgment of just compensation 
^ {ACUJ? Ml £LV <0 *<P //>^^VV/ QM4 
.are to be paid diArectly ro^the owner-defendants, to-wit: 
Juniata Irene Burge, Robert G. Barrows and Beatrice 
Irene Barrows without notice to or approval by the 
tenant-defendants. 
Dated this day of August, 1985. 
BY THE COURT: 
Homer F* Wilkinson 
District Court Judge 
APROVED AS TO FROM: 
FOX, EDWARDS, GARDINER & BROWN 
By 
William D, Oswald 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
Redevelopment Agency of Salt 
Lake City 
non*;^:* 
I . ' . 
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John 25. Evans 
Attcyrney fo r Defendants 
Burge, Barrows and Barrows 
8 
*) 
IO 
11 
Ray Zoll 
Attorney for Defendants
 r 
Mortensen, Wilfred and Egan ±J^^<W*w'* 
and Pro Se * 
iM^A 
UTAH NEIGHBORHOOD DEVELOPMENT ACT 11-19-23.9 
funds belonging to them or within their control in any bonds and other obliga-
tions issued by an agency pursuant to this chapter. These bonds and other 
obligations shall be authorized security for all public deposits. It is the pur-
pose of this section to authorize any persons, political subdivisions, and offi-
cers, public or private, to use any funds owned or controlled by them for the 
purchase of any such bonds or other obligations. Nothing contained in this 
section with regard to legal investments shall be construed as relieving any 
person of any duty of exercising reasonable care in selecting securities. 
History: C. 1953, 11-19-23.8, enacted L. 
1971, ch. 17, $ 25. 
11-19-23.9. Agency authority within project area — Acqui-
sition of property. 
Within the project area an agency may: 
(1) purchase, lease, obtain option upon, acquire by gift, grant, bequest, 
devise, or otherwise, any real or personal property, any interest in prop-
erty, and any improvements on it; or 
(2) acquire real property by eminent domain; but when the power of 
eminent domain is exercised under the provisions of this chapter and the 
party whose property is affected contests the matter in the district court, 
the court may, in cases where the amount of the award exceeds the 
amount offered, award in addition to his just compensation, costs, includ-
ing a reasonable attorney's fee as determined by the court. The court, or 
jury in cases tried before a jury, may also award a reasonable sum as 
compensation for the costs and expenses, if any, of relocating the owner 
whose property is acquired or a party conducting a business on such 
acquired property. An award may also be made for damages to any fix-
tures or personal property owned by the owner of such acquired property 
or owned by the person conducting a business on such acquired property, 
if such fixtures or personal property are damaged as a result of such 
acquisition or relocation. 
History: C. 1953,11-19-23.9, enacted by L. 
1971, ch. 17, $ 26. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Fair market value. which a willing purchaser would pay in view of 
Testimony as to the dollar value of the use of the best possible use of the premises. Redevel-
an old building was properly excluded, since opment Agency v. Barrutia, 526 P.2d 47 (Utah 
the market value is determined by the price 1974). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Utah Law Review. — Note, Urban Plan- Past, Present and Future, 1971 Utah L. Rev. 
ning and Development — Race and Poverty — 46. 
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bridges to be constructed as part of the 
project-and i(3) the earnings accruing from 
the bonds proceeds, pending their use for 
construction of the highway system. •*'•••' •-• 
On May 24^  1950, the Improvement Com-
mission adopted a resolution! authorizing 
. the issuance of the bonds tieretdfofe^ <ie^  
bribed.' Chapter [25002, Acts of 1949, des-
ignated the highway system as State'Rokds 
and authorized the use of the; proceeds of 
the boilds for construction £f* the/project. 
June15, 1950, the Improvement Conimissroh 
End-the-State Road Department executed 
the lease purchase agreement and the Board 
of County Commissioners approved the use 
of/ the.' three funds heretofore detailed; for 
servicing the bonds.;.. 
In fine, the'lease purchase Agreement 
vests title'to the highway system in the 
Imprbvemeh'^ Commis i^oh/'it provides that 
the' Improvement Commission issue the 
bonds and turn the proceeds over to the 
State Road Department to construct the 
highway system as1 the agent o f the' Im-i 
provement Commission. The Improvement 
Commission liases the highway • system to 
the State'Road Department which agrees to 
build and maintain said highway system and 
operate the bridges as toll bridges, the ren-
tals and other charges to be appropriated as 
heretofore specified. 
Section 16 (subdivision c) Article IX of 
the. Constitution, F.S.A., authorizes 80 per 
cent of tjie surplus, gas tax to be remitted 
to the State Road Department for con-
struction and reconstruction of county 
roads, under various sections of Chapter 
420 F.S.Ai At the request of ikhKtounty 
.Commissioners, the State Rdad Department 
is authorized to pledge future accruals'from 
the 80 per cent of the two cent tax to the 
credit of the icbunty. Other provisions 
of the Statutes enumerated herein, author-
ize each step taken in this' transaction 
S9 we conclude that the chancellor gave the 
correct answer to question one. We find 
ftothirig in the proceedings that could be 
construed as pledging the' taxing lpWer to 
service the bonds. State v..State Board 
of Administration,'157 Fla, 360, 25 So2d 
880; State v. Florida State Improvement 
Commission,' 160'Fla, 230, 34 So2d 443. 
[2] The second question is whether^ 
not* the provision in the lease 
agreement for appointment of ¥ 
for the project drawn in question,]* 
and valid. 
Provision for appointment of a receive 
under circumstances similar to thaf tj?1 
case have been approved and -enforci 
Hopkins v. Baldwin, 123 Fla. 649;:;lo7»^ 
677; State y. City of Tallahassee,^J? 
476, 195 So. 402. . "',. • * £ . 
The appellants have failed to carry» 
burden of showing error iii the contract; 
other proceedings complained Of,'W-5! 
judgment appealed from is affirmed!ni-:#' 
Affirmed 
ADAMS, C. J. 
ROBERTS, JJ., concur 
• : . " • ! ' • « ! & ; < 
and THOMAS
 0 -1U 
,,!., Ml 
(o }wimwi s> w; .t„ 
DAOE COUNTY v. BRIGHAM et al. \< 
Supreme Court of Florida, en. Banc -. v
 0 M 
March 14, 1950. 
On Rehearing July 25,1950. 
11
 *t|r-
Eminent domain proceedings by Dad* 
County, a political subdivision of the Stated 
of Florida against E. F. P. Brigham;ian4^ 
others. The Circuit Court for Dade County '^ 
Charles A. Carroll, J., taxed fees, of exper f^ 
witnesses who testified for defendants /?V|jf 
and petitioner^ 
Supreme ' Oou-* ^ r 
costs against petitioner, 
brought certiorari. The 
Hobeoh, J., held that to extent 'that 
were reasonably and necessarily incurredfuT 
defense of condemnation case, they would*!)? 
allowed. " >»iieei 
Certiorari denied. 
Chapman and Thomas, JJ„ dissented.^ 
Terrell, J., dissented on rehearing. 
See also, Fla^ 40 So.2d 835. 
Alt I. Eminent domain «=>265(3) Under constitutional'provision declar^l 
ing that private'property shall not be taken4! 
without just compensation, costs in condenP^ 
-pxUmrr"!^1 
J^J^^^Vim^.'l^mAii^ Fla. >603 
Cite as 47 So.2d 602 
cjJrbc'eedirigs include fees of expert diem for ordinary witnesses, the reason 
for the rule'-being, that expert" witnesses 
sell their services much as law services and 
other professional services are sold, he is 
not required by law to testify,' hence he must 
be paid by the one who produces him." 
JgteSeV 'for defendants. F.S.A. § 73.-
>JA'.Const Declaration of Rights, 
[Eminent domain <§=>265(3) 
afjcondemnation proceedings, the al-
fpyanfiCf.or disallowance of fees of ex-
fywitnesses for defendant is a matter for 
e judge; to decide in the exercise of 
G§|g£odi judicial discretion. 
{Hudson? :&.Cason, Miami, John W. Mc-
irter, Calvin Johnson, Tampa, and A. 
L^JtriBlack, Dania, David V. Kerns, Tampa 
ijJ^jdJRis^on Boykin, Chattahoochee, for ap-
|$llantrr< 
*F. P. Brigham, and T. C Britton, 
• ^ ^ 3 - . ^ Appellees.. 
^ ^ H O B S O N , Justice. 
gfe!s^Dns casc *s before us on petition for 
•itoof icertiorari. The primary and con-
Swllirig^question. presented for our deter-
£jnination is whether the Circuit Judge erred 
[^ taxing the fees of expert witnesses who 
ft&tifiedf*forthe appellees, defendants below, 
53*cdsis against the appellant, petitioner 
flow, in'^"condemnation proceeding. The 
tppellant insists that expert witnesses' 
|f&3v are not legal costs as contemplated 
It^'the statutes of the State of Florida and 
jgrelwtiolly unauthorized by' law. In support 
i&'position the appellant relies heavily 
ori'our opinion and judgment in the case 
Df^tnland : Waterways-Development Co, 
Dity of Jacksonville, Fla., 38 So.2d 676, 
/'arid entertains the view that the opin-
P:and judgment in that case concluded 
t question raised in this case favorable 
Appellant's position. We do 'not believe 
:the holding in* the case of Inland Wa-
way Development Co. v. City of Jackson-
supra, is necessarily or inevitably 
htrblling. 
a that case this Court, speaking through 
Justice Terrell simply stated the gen-
rule as follows: 
i^Ai to the cost of expert witnesses, the 
lie generally approved is that the con-
iraor i s not required to pay such costs 
fahd the amount allowed by law as pet 
To recite and approve a general rule in 
one case is-not the equivalent of establish-
ing it as an ^unyielding, inflexible guide in 
every case. We clearly indicated we were 
not deciding that the general rule with ref-
erence to expert witnesses' fees would ob-
tain without exception. The question as 
stated by Mr. Justice Terrell was "Whether 
or not the petitioner is required to pay the 
charges of expert witnesses, including the 
cost of photographs and certified copies of 
public records * * *.".' (Italics sup-
plied). We have held that an opinion em-
anating from this Court must be construed 
in the light of the facts and circumstances 
of the case which was then before us for 
decision. Pearson et al. v. Taylor, 159 Fla. 
775, 32 So.2d, 826; Kann v. American 
Surety Co. of New York, 120 Fla. 50,. 162 
So. 335; Shelfer v. American Agr. Chemi-
cal Co., 113 Fla. 108, 152 So. 611 After 
stating the question above quoted the writer 
of that opinion then said: 
"We can think of no reason why photo-
graphs and certified copies of public records 
would have any place in the proof of 'full 
compensation' or 'just value' for lands 
condemned for public use, but if in the dis-
cretion of the trial court such instruments 
were of use value in a condemnation pro-
ceeding, we would not be inclined to hold 
kin* in error except upon a very strong 
showing of abuse of discretion." . (Italics 
supplied.) . : T 
The effect of our ruH'jrtg. was an affirm-
ance of the Circuit Judge 'who disallowed 
expert witnesses' fees. In the present case 
the Circuit Judge allowed expert witnesses' 
fees and included them in the judgment. 
He gave sound, logical and cogent reasons 
therefor and determined that in this case 
expert witnesses definitely were of "use 
Value" 'for they were essential in order for 
the defendants below to meet the plaintiff, 
Dade County, upon equal footing. We4 
quote froin this order: 
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"Freedom t^o own and hold, property is 
a, valued a,nd, guarded right .under our gov-
ernment
 t .Full compensation ^s,guaranteed 
by the Constitution to those whose property 
is divested from them by eminent domain. 
The theory and purpose of that guaranty is 
that the owner shall be made whole so far 
as possible and practicable'. 
"The courts should not be' blind to the 
realities of the condemnation process. Any 
excuse which the Court might have for dis-
claiming knowledge of just what goes on, 
is entirely removed by the fact that the 
Court itself views the trial and proceedings 
and has personal knowledge of all such 
matters. The Court sees that the County is 
armed with engineering testimony, en-
gineering data, charts and drawings pre-
pared by expert draftsmen. 
"The court sees that the County produces 
appraisers, „ expert witnesses relating to 
value, usually more than one in number, 
whose .elaborate statement of their qual-
ifications, training, experience and clientele 
indicate a painstaking and elaborate ap-
praisal by them calling for an expenditure 
by
 fthe County of fees to such experts and 
appraisers which are commensurate there-
with, and customary for like services of 
such persons. A lay defendant whose prop-
erty is to be taken is called upon to defend 
against such preparation and expert testi-
mony of the County. It is unreasonable to 
say that such a defendant must suffer a dis-
advantage of being unable to meet this array 
of able, expert evidence, unless he shall pay 
for the same out of his own pocket. 
"Can the County contend that such high 
priced evidentiary items are not a part of 
the 'costs of the proceedings' when they 
themselves by presentation of the same in 
their case, make ^em a part of the proceed-
ings in their behalf?0. 
-
c & 
"It does not follow that all expenses to 
which the defendant elects to put himself 
in, connection wjth the defense of such a 
case may be collected on a costs; judgment 
J t i s the duty of the Court to inquire into 
the items of cost, to be satisfied,, for ex-
apiple. that,,the appraisers arc not too nunvj 
e/ous, and that their charges arc proper, 
that the engineering fees and charts, draw-
i' 
ings, maps, photographs etc. were^n 
ably; considered necessary by^  .counsel* 
defendants in, their handling, of
 rth« ^ 
and that they appear to the Court to 
been reasonably deemed necessary a} 
kind and quantity, and the same applied ^ 
other costs which the Court may be7caile<i-
upon to allow which are outside of the^cS-'! 
tomary law suit type of court costs consist: 
ing of clerk's and sheriffs chargest-fcglJr* 
witness per diem fees and simple report-^ 
ing charges." -£§£, 
"The evidence presented before me es» 
tablished that the charges of the various 
experts were reasonable and within < thfc 
range of those customarily charged' ancU 
paid in this community for serviced *Sf 
similarly qualified persons for similar^Stfr *-
vices. .' M^ &\ 
"To the extent that costs are reasonably 
and necessarily incurred in the defense of a 
condemnation case like this they should f 
be allowed, subject to court reviews there-
of, and determination as to the necessity 
ami propriety by the Court as' indicated 
above." ' i £ 
i.l r;. r 
[1, 2] The foregoing observations of the * 
learned Circuit Judge need but slight,am> * 
plification. We approve the logic of ,:hi* > 
pronouncements. We might, and do,.add h 
thereto the thought that Section 73>Hkl 
Florida Statutes 1941, F.S.A., which, <pro*v§ 
vides "All costs of proceedings shall be,paJ$ f 
by the petitioner, including a,reasonable %tr'M 
torney's fee * * * " should be construe*! ?> 
in the light of Section 12 of ,our E>edarar!]» 
tion of Rights, F.S.A., which declares thajt 
private property shall not be taken "without 
just compensation." (Italics supplied 
When so cpnstrued the language "All cost^j 
of proceedings * * * " must be,,held*! 
in a proper case, to include fees of exj 
witnesses for the, defendants. The allow5 
ance or disallowance of such fees should (I 
a matter for the trial judge to decide in ,the\ 
exercise of sound judicial discretion. 
Since the*« owner of private property, 
sought to be condemned is forced into court 
by.one to whom ,he owes no obligation,4 it 
cannot be said that he ,has received "iv$$ 
compensation" for his property if he iscpmjj 
pelled to pay out of his own pocket tfooy 
:r Cite as 47 So.2d 605 
^ a . 605 
\-jot establishing the fair value of the 
erty/ which expenses in some cases 
[..conceivably exceed such value. The 
t;pf jthe land owner in this situation 
iwHL stated by the New York court in 
ufWater»» Supply in City of New York, 
g ^ V p p . D i v . 219, 109 N.Y.S. 652, 654, as 
Inflows:; ; 
&
- £?H$ does n o t w a n t t o seH- The property 
gllfctekcn from him through the exertion of 
s ^ ^ b i g h powers of the statute, and the 
Ei drfrit of the Constitution clearly requires 
ZTjjit he (shall not be thus compelled to part 
TT jrfth what belongs to him without the pay-
. ^tnt, not alone of the abstract value of the 
" ifopcrty, but of all the necessary expenses 
;* JJoorred in fixing that value. This would 
^gfrrtn^to be dictated by sound morals, as 
'J *eft as by the spirit of the Constitution; 
~;f » d i t will not be presumed that the Legis-
V IftlPS n a s intended to deprive the owner of 
" ftgiproperty of the full protection which 
] fcjp?>gs to him as a matter of right/' 
% It is our view that we should deny certi-
" orari and uphold the order entered by the 
\ CJrcuit Judge. In so doing we are not 
% tuning counter to our conclusion in the 
" IglfUu} (Waterway Co. suit for there we 
* Upheld the general rule and the opinioa in 
that case does not indicate that the ruling of 
A the Circuit Judge was challenged on the 
* ground of abuse of discretion. Had the 
p* (frcumstances there justified an exception 
g, to t^jic general rule, abuse of .discretion 
«£ Slight .have entered into that picture and 
m conceivably our opinion might have been 
¥* different. We sustained the invocation by 
^•^e?trial judge of the "general rule" and 
is,exercise of sound judicial discretion in 
*f^lying i t In this case we sustain the trial 
Eilfii^j.for recognizing an exception to the 
^Jjcnepl rule" and his exercise of sound 
aj discretion. 
tforari denied. 
to^MS, C J., and TERRELL, SE-
|BMNG and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. ' 
^PMAN and THOMAS, JJ., dissent 
.,JBM?MAN and THOMAS, Justices 
I f f^sscnt £^e Inland .Waterway Dc7 
pment Company ct al. v. City of Jack-
ille, Fla., 38 So.2d 676. 
< N>On'Rehearing. h"r , /* < 
, PER CURIAM. ,,
 4 
Pursuant'to an order» granting a rehear-
ing and reargument in this cause, the Court 
has heard arguments of counsel for the re-
spective parties for the second time and, be-
ing now, fully advised in the premises, it is 
our conclusion that we should adhere to 
our former opinion and judgment entered 
herein. 
It is so ordered. 
ADAMS, C J., SEBRING, HOBSON 
and ROBERTS, JJ., concur. 
TERRELL, CHAPMAN, and THOM-
AS, JJ., dissent 
MT «•*«• srtrm. rsmj> 
JONES v. NEiBERGALL et al. 
Supreme Court of Florida, en Banc. 
Aug. 1, 1950. 
Suit by Paul Jones against Pauline Jones 
Niebergall and another for a declaratory de-
cree construing the rights of the parties un-
der the will of Willie Jones, deceased. The 
Circuit Court for Palm Beach County, C. E. 
Chlllingworth, J., rendered a decree for de-
fendants, and the complainant appealed. 
The Supreme Court, 42 So.2d 443, affirmed 
Per Curiam. The Supreme Court on recon-
sideration, Per Curiam, reaffirmed decree of 
the chancellor without prejudice to the par-
ties to recast the pleadings. 
Order accordingly* 
t. Appeal and error <§=>839(l) 
Where appellant contended for first 
time on reconsideration that order affirming 
chancellor's decree created inequitable sit-
uation, but pleadings had not presented 
such equities nor had the trial court ruled 
qn t i^em, and, they were not urged until on 
reconsideration, they wpuld not be adjudi-
cated, but either party could recast thejr 
pleadings, a^d in a subsequent hearing be-
fore the chancellor such issues could be de-
termined and ruled on 
